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Abstract
This article considers the most important philosophical work of Stan-
isław Brzozowski, Ideas. Introduction to the Philosophy of Historical Ma-
turity, as an opportunity to examine the question of what leads some
philosophers to set out their philosophical standpoint in the form of a
biography of thought. This article poses the following questions: Why
is it that an author’s biography should subordinate reality to philo-
sophical thought? Do we expect an author to render an account of
what kind of man he is, and by what path he came to his convic-
tions concerning every philosophical theory? I would like to demon-
strate that it is philosophy that needs biographical testimony. Thus
biography becomes a place where man develops some orientation in
reality, based on past actions that were recorded, the values assigned
to events, the significance given to concrete aspects of his own life,
and a multitude of minute facts. By creating himself in the biography
of his own thought as a particular character, he builds a foundation
for himself to plan the future.
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The Reviewers have had the kindness of bringing to my attention the existence of
the latest book by M. Urbanowski, Stanisław Brzozowski. Nowoczesność (Łódź 2017)
as well as the letters of Stanisław Brzozowski, in edition of M. Sroka (Kraków 1970).
The author should also like to thank the Reviewer who offered advice and inspiring
criticism while pointing out important complementary broadening approach to her
own in such areas as the ethical basis for the Stanisław Brzozowski’s philosophy of
act and the reception of Catholic modernism in Brzozowski’s thought.
1 Philosophy as biography of thought
“Man is writing well only when he writes himself”, Lichtenberg once said.1
Can we allow this remark to also include philosophising? Can it be that a
good thought – one which is alive and able to appear as a historically shap-
ing power – is based on some intimate, personal, individual experiencewhich
is then accounted for by a philosophical system? “Metaphysics, when dis-
entangled, reduces itself to biography and ethical history”, was Stanisław
Brzozowski’s view2. “What is not biography possesses no existence at all.
What claims the right to any super-biographical, super-concrete, individual
meaning is, in point of fact, less real.”3 “There is one power only: making use
of one’s own and only life to fertilise time”.4 Realising this state of affairs,
presages true historical maturity, according to the author of Idee. Wstęp do
filozofii dojrzałości dziejowej (Ideas. Introduction to the Philosophy of Historical
Maturity).
Classifying philosophical works as good or unsuccessful is obviously not
the intention of this article; nor do I propose to claim that philosophy not
grounded in individual experience is impossible. However, I am interested
1 G. Ch. Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, hrsg. von Wolfgang Promies (München 1962), [B
95]. Pochwała wątpienia. Bruliony i inne pisma, selected and translated to Polish by T. Zator-
ski (Gdańsk: słowo/obraz terytoria, 2005), p. 51. The first Polish edition of this essay: “Idee.
Wstęp do filozofii dojrzałości dziejowej Stanisława Brzozowskiego jako filozoficzny pamiętnik”,
was published in Oblicza Narcyza: obecność autora w dziele, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu
Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2008, pp. 435–456.
2 S. Brzozowski, Pamiętnik (Diary), with fragments of the author’s letters selected and com-
mented on by O. Ortwin, introduction by A. Mencwel (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 2000), p. 94.
3 Ibidem, p. 126.
4 S. Brzozowski, Idee. Wstęp do dojrzałości dziejowej (Ideas. Introduction to the Philosophy of
Historical Maturity), also: Złudzenia racjonalizmu (The Illusions of Rationalism), introduction:
A. Walicki (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1990), p. 430.
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in themotives and rationales which cause some authors to outline their philo-
sophical standpoint in the form of a biography of thought. Brzozowski per-
ceives his work as the “diary of the re-convalescence” (when he speaks of the
Ideas) or the “diary of a philosophical work” (when he refers to his own writ-
ing). And to his most important philosophical work, he provides the follow-
ing characterisation: “it consists of the stages of my thought process working
upon itself, as they advanced one after the next and complemented one an-
other”.5 I should like to establish here, as the subject of my consideration, the
assumptions that lie behind this sort of understanding of philosophical writ-
ing.Thus, I intend to treat the Ideas by Brzozowski as a pretext for examining
the philosophical motivation of this kind.
We begin with these questions: Why is it that an author’s biography –
the portrait of an individual life, differentiating each of its aspects – should
subordinate reality to philosophical thought? Do we expect that the author
renders an account of what kind of man he is, and by what path he came to
his convictions for every philosophical theory?
2 The practical attitude of philosophy. Philosophy
as a lawgiver of life and action needs a prac-
tical genius rather than a theory. The necessity
of bearing personal testimony
Our starting point now requires a brief outline of Brzozowski’s thinking
about the tasks of his discipline. The point of view of our author on this
subject is linked with his understanding of the meaning of philosophical
history for the European consciousness, as this history had developed to
his day. Brzozowski understood the history of philosophy to be the self-
consciousness of the European spirit, which, as a developing sequence, led
from Kant, through classical German idealism (closed shut with Nietzsche’s
writings), toMarx. Nietzsche occupies a special place in this process, as it was
he who, for the first time, brought to light the singular historical responsibil-
ity of philosophy, as well as its separateness from the other cultural activities
of our species: it creates the values which set the course of development for
the human universe. The values that emerge as a result of the philosopher
5 Ibidem, p. 70. See also: pp. 75, 463.
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having some sort of life experience then become the basis for our real activ-
ity in the world, the effects of which turn – whether or not we are conscious
of this fact – into the material with which we build ourselves. Recognising
the above, Nietzsche simultaneously discovered a way to express the general
drift towards the self-consciousness of the European spirit in the nineteenth
century. Brzozowski, who, by his own reckoning, had thought deeply about
the history of the philosophy, followed this trail wilfully:
Today all threads of the cognition leading towards [philosophy]
are snapping. Contemporary thinkers feel that something es-
sential has changed, but dare not tell themselves that cognitive
thought cannot be the satisfactory equivalent and the proper
tool of current philosophy; that it does not suffice to know every-
thing taught by scientific philosophy to be a philosopher, but
rather, it is necessary to be born able to consciously experience
existential processes. The world assumes a new shape in each
man, changes take place in every man that possesses meaning
on a larger or smaller scale and extends his consciousness, but
only in the philosopher do these changes become aware, only
he can be the conscience of the emerging world and make its
becoming his own action.6
Philosophy is not a form of cognition, but rather somethingmuch
more profound; it is a form of life, a form of an action in becom-
ing.7
Universal history, as Schiller used to say, always appears to the philo-
sopher’s eye as if it were a true treasury of inspiration. Whenever the philo-
sophical mind starts to look at history, the “instinct that searches for har-
mony” awakens in him, which frees historical phenomena from “the fetters
of the blind fortune” and “the course of worldly events is given clear form”,8
Bowing slightly to this classic author, we permit ourselves to notice that the
6 S. Brzozowski, Filozofia czynu (The Philosophy of Act), [in:] Idee…, pp. 127–128.
7 Ibidem, 127.
8 F. Schiller, Wass heisst und zu welchem Ende studiert Man Universalgeschichte (Teutscher
Merkur, November 1789). Czym jest historia powszechna i w jakim celu warto ją studiować?
(What is, and to What End do We Study, Universal History) [in:] Dzieła wybrane (Selected
Works), selection by S. H. Kaszyński (Poznań:Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2006), vol. 1, p. 307.
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investigator of intellectual history, who has been gifted with a reflective tem-
perament, and who has at his disposal facts supporting both the growing and
the regression of humanity’s self-consciousness, optimism and pessimism
with regard to the sensible planning of its own way of life, chooses a view-
point which will: “supply the reason with more satisfaction, and the heart
with joy”. For Brzozowski, who was striving to establish a thread to link Kant
to Marx, the history of philosophy was the portrait of man who, throughout
history, was forever recreating both himself, and that which from a naїve
perspective of consciousness he had previously considered an element for-
eign to him; his calling also consists of activities to bring about a rational
interpersonal order. What remained for the European consciousness was to
measure itself bravely against this diagnosis.
Brzozowski’s philosophy seeks to be a reflection on human activity in the
world and its foundations – above all on the will conceived as the rational
will; therefore, its drift is as practical as possible. It was the philosophers of
will who, first and foremost, appeared to provide inspiration for this author
– we are now obviously interested in the principle by which he selected his
philosophical readings: apart from Kant, the classics of German idealism and
Nietzsche, we find among them: Sorel, Bergson, Carlyle, Blondel, and Marx.
The absent figure is Saint Augustine – according to Hannah Arendt, who sur-
veyed the history of philosophy discovering the new faculty of themind – the
first philosopher of will, though it was still then perceived as the arbitrary
ability to choose. Classical German idealism, which continues the Kantian
concept of the will bound only by its own rule, occupies a privileged place in
Brzozowski’s thinking. This decision between two concepts of will – on the
one hand as a liberum arbitrium and on the other as Kantian practical reason
– in favour of the latter, is pivotal to the thinking of our author. Alongside
his philosophical readings, English literature was also important in shaping
his mind: he highly valued its brave and clear-sighted humour in perceiv-
ing the matters of this world, in whose inhospitable reality the individual
desirous of giving meaning to his existence struggles with the irrational ele-
ment of life. At the same time, s/he holds delusions of neither anticipating
the consequences of his/her acts, nor relying credulously on the maxims s/he
believes. The tradition of the German idealism and the British sense of em-
piricism – this connection appears merely eccentric at a first glance; would
it not eventually lead us into a way of thinking about mankind which the
post-Hegelian epoch tried to instil, i.e. the German historical school, Wil-
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helm Dilthey or Georg Simmel? And thus, towards the image of man as be-
ing a historical creature who makes use of the wisdom of past generations as
well as the endeavours of his/her cultural circle in his attempt to live reason-
ably with others? In this context, the remarks of a French historian, Bertrand
Saint-Sernin, are worth recalling, in which he shrewdly concluded that: “Eng-
lish literature absorbs all that Germans charge their Geisteswissenschaften
with, as well as the moral novels, the prototype of which was Sybil by Dis-
raeli, better than any sociological poll; it presents the state of the society or
the doings of some group before the eyes of civilisation. Fictional prose thus
becomes a cognitive instrument”.9 However, the question of rational will and
the historical man has to remain open awhile, because it seems that now we
can return to our two opening questions.
We need thinking or theory to find our way through the thicket of the
interpersonal matters, and lead our own lives in a responsible manner – as
Brzozowski expressed it – and philosophising is not a pure, disinterested
activity of the mind, but, in all respects, springs from the needs of our prac-
tice and is grounded by it. Behind this conviction, resembling a philosophy
of life position, was also a certain political project, which aimed at making
Polish society historically mature. And thus, “a society which would be able
to create a political idea possessing solid consequences in society and life”,10
for which it is necessary to learn to think in categories of reality (“terrifying
but irrefutable”), and to replace “emotional thinking” with the ability to be
rationally constructive in the framework of the existing political order. This
thought is meant to guarantee good interpersonal order. Brzozowski was not
only a theoretician, but also the author of a certain political idea, which was
conservative insofar as it strove to grapple with the facts.
Philosophy is not the knowledge of something superhuman, it is
the self-consciousness of humanity, its self-government. It is the
creation of those thoughts which can be the converging points
of the powers of the humanity.11
Humanity will be what it makes of itself, whether involuntarily
9 B. Saint-Sernin, La Raison au XXe siècle (Éditions du Seuil, 1995). Rozum w XX wieku (Reason
in the 20th Century), Polish transl. M. L. Kalinowski, B. Banasiak, (Gdańsk: słowo/obraz teryt-
oria, 2001), p. 137.
10 S. Brzozowski, Anty-Engels, [in:] Idee…, p. 321.
11 S. Brzozowski, Epigenetyczna teoria historii (The Epigenetical Theory of History) [in:] Idee…,
p. 181.
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or in full consciousness. But whenever it should think, it strains
thereby for conscious dominion over itself.12
This is thinking as a lawgiver of life and action; but what kind of think-
ing? As a theory established beforehand by “official specialists in guiding
human affairs” – to borrow a phrase from the British humour of Isaiah Ber-
lin13 – or rather one based on careful observation of human behaviour both
social and asocial, including one’s own; philosophy has been asking itself
this question for a long while. In the Platonic ideal, the philosopher entered
the practical life of polis to gain a new ideal of reality, which he owed to
the solitary contemplation of the orderly world of pure being. The ideal polis
from the philosopher’s mind would be, in the future, rendered into the ma-
terial of the world we experience. “Platonic humanism (…) does not draw its
political standpoint from the existing world (…) but from the idea which is its
true reality” 14 – as Werner Jaeger commented – however Plato’s conviction
that the establishment of the ideal polis is possible “protects (…) the notion
of the future, for which the philosopher prepares himself, from falling foul
of pure fiction, and with its possibility of being transformed into the field of
reality gives the theoretical life of the philosopher this wonderful intensity
which is lacking in pure science”.15
“The wonderful intensity” of the Platonic theory – let us linger a while
with this last aesthetic remark of the historian, which incidentally also gets
down to the crux of the matter, the relation between thinking and action in
rationalistic projects. The attempt to pierce through the mechanism of the
world and overcome the course of its events through the powers of his/her
own intellect awakens a particular philosophical feeling in the author of such
an enterprise. Its charm seems to have a great deal in common with the sat-
isfaction experienced by the audience which follows a theatrical perform-
ance, wherein both the autonomy of art and reality remain unimpaired. And,
equally with the unruffled self-confidence of the author of an educational
novel, who helps his protagonists to avoid the traps set by life. Brzozowski
12 Ibidem, p. 182.
13 I. Berlin,The Hedgehog and the Fox (New York: New American Library, 1957). Jeż i lis. Esej o
pojmowaniu historii u Tołstoja (The Hedgehog and the Fox), [in:] Rosyjscy myśliciele (Russian
Thinkers), Polish transl. S. Kowalski, afterword by A. Walicki (Warsaw: Prószyński i Spółka,
2003), p. 35.
14 See: W. Jaeger, Paideia. Die Formung des griechischen Menschen (Berlin 1959). Paideia, Polish
transl.: M. Plezia (Warsaw: PIW, 1964), vol. 2, pp. 324–325.
15 Ibidem, p. 325.
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called this position the “philanthropic viewpoint”, rooted in ourmost natural,
yet very delusive persuasion, that we are able to retire from the venture of
life into the safe refuge of a single standpoint:
for to put life straight (…) just as the characters oft-times do in
thewonderful novels of Dickens, onemust have a certain, secure,
established standpoint on life, something ready-made – and of
course a good novelistic composition was here a confirmation of
the instinct of home, a family hearth as a haven from which one
can observe one’s whole life in safety. Life presents itself as a
logical whole only when we feel in possession of a life which is
in some way provided for.16
Nothing more clearly shows us the heart of the rationalistic viewpoint
than tendentious art, which wants to be useful for the society as the model
of a virtuous life:
Whenever the rationalist begins to create living characters, their
lives seem some obstacle to his own. He less builds them than
explains why something so irrational and illogical as the living
human being could come into existence. The rationalist deludes
himself that aside from the game of accidental life he has a fuller
life, and that this current one created by him was the reason for
which the deeper one could not unfold. In fact, however, there
is only a bare, white plane of abstraction beyond life in the con-
crete, and in creating, the rationalist feels creativity to be an
obstacle; it does not develop from life and towards life, no, it
is something accidental that can exist only due to the existence
of that other, against which this accidental one turns itself.17
However, the intellectual satisfaction which comes as a result of being
master of one’s thought, one’s ability to guide it skilfully and set it forth
clearly, often strengthens the philosophical belief that one is correct vis a vis
life, and much the same arises from the feeling that, after hard work and a
long education in dialectics, one is finally on firm and indisputable ground
from which to comment safely on the deeds of the actors taking part in the
16 S. Brzozowski, Złudzenia racjonalizmu (The Illusions of Rationalism), [in:] Idee…, p. 411.
17 Ibidem, p. 410.
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games of history.This was the philosophical myth of the “homestead-refuge”
which historical researchers – professionals or simply sufficiently sagacious
amateurs who turned towards historical studies for political, ethical, or an-
thropological instruction – recognised as a truly hazardous illusion. Brzo-
zowski called it the “poisoned food” which “while nourishing the victors”
simultaneously prepares their future defeat. “In historical events one best
observes the prohibition to eat from the tree of knowledge”, Tolstoy once
said. To rationally plan our affairs in the world we obviously need to know
its rules; however, such rules are not obtained by escaping from life. This
practical genius is of more use here than any “well-composed theory”: the
art of scenting out the situation and perceiving its various sides, putting one-
self in the place of the other, a sense of moderation which during a clash
of arguments allows us to maintain a peaceful co-existence and simple, old-
fashioned tact. Formatters involving polis,Aristotle advised phronesis, under-
stood as “far-sightedness”, a “faculty for passing judgements”, a “cleverness
in judgement”, or a “practical wisdom”, which one could learn only by living
and trying out his principles in reality. How much these ideas are actually
worth, and what, in fact, the values are which give reasons for our behaviour
can be revealed only by carrying them into effect. At the moment when as
it seems that we are beginning a new undertaking as sensibly as possible,
we still have no idea what indeed we are attempting. Only life is capable
of showing what, in all these schemes, was a lasting and positive force, and
what was no more than dangerous illusion. How to make man a conscious
“creator of himself”, how to teach him to solve the problems which derive
from the “necessity of his taking control over himself”18 – this was what
Brzozowski considered to be the most difficult aspect of the new philosophy,
which for the first time sought to take responsibility for the world it also
shaped through its notions.
A philosophy which appears in the public space as a “legislator of life,
and its architect” should first vindicate its authority to play this part. He who
seeks to influence the course of events also affects other people through his
own actions and has to provide evidence of being entitled to do so.This neces-
sity of bearing personal testimony to one’s character, and not only to prove
one’s philosophical professionalism, was treated as almost obvious by those
minds in which Nietzsche’s teachings met with some response; Brzozowski
belongs to their rare circle.
18 S. Brzozowski, Epigenetyczna teoria historii (The Epigenetical Theory of History), [in:] Idee…,
p. 182.
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In On the Genealogy of Morality the question is put: “Could there be
enough pride, courage, ingenuity, self-confidence, will to spirit, will to re-
sponsibility, and freedom of will by now that from here on the philosopher
can indeed exist upon the earth?”19 The philosopher, and therefore, “the man
of the greatest responsibility, in whose conscience lies the whole develop-
ment of humanity”,20 the figure ready to take on the “great responsibilities”.
Nietzsche introduces the notion of the philosophy as a hazardous way of life
which one cannot learn, but for which one has to “be born gifted”.21 This in
no way means that one can get by without being self-educated, to be able
to take up those tasks which measure up to one’s natural talents. At any
rate, ever since this point one cannot philosophise in an impersonal manner
without taking responsibility for all the possible worlds which arise as a res-
ult of the values one proclaims, and for one’s own existence as a fact tied to
them.
He who desires to judge reality and to set its course must himself be a
personality, and possess a practical understanding of it – in planning it one
must be prepared for the irrational and unclear in the world, the accidental
and phenomenal – in thinking one must rely on one’s own hitherto exper-
ience of life. That which has genuinely been experienced by an individual
then guarantees the quality of a thought which has social and ethical aspir-
ations:
It is not enough to speak of character-worship, of the necessity
of maintaining a vital relationship with the life of the nation, of
understanding that it is the most profound basis for our being
in the world and that our vital relation to it, which we create
through our everyday real life, is the only organ of any true
theoretical and practical life, if, at the same time, all our intel-
lectual culture is based on other premises. (…) Modern culture
establishes an illusion of solitude round about young minds as
if nothing but abstract ideas were and could be acknowledged
as real. Every thought in this book was attained by long and
hard work; if the pages of it could speak they would reveal my
19 F. Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in Einzelbänden, hrsg. von G. Colli
und M. Montinari (München, Berlin/New York 1988), Bd. 5, p. 361. Z genealogii moralności,
Polish translation by L. Staff (Warsaw 1913), p. 138.
20 Ibidem, p. 79, in Polish edition: p. 86.
21 S. Brzozowski, Filozofia czynu (The Philosophy of Act), [in:] Idee…, p. 127.
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years of struggle. I can say this because I would be able to show
precisely and accurately the genealogy of each of the thoughts
written down here. I know that every reader who feels inclined
to translate thoughts into the language of the personal experiences
will see that he is dealing with reality, I know that this book may
be useful ... [emphasis by I. S.].22
3 What is biography? Biography as a way to jus-
tify a theory in the field of practice as well as to
allow it to act in a phenomenal reality
The biography appeared to describe the shaping of a uniform personality
over the course of an individual’s life, which was at the crossroads of what
existed through self-conditioning and external circumstances. As Albrecht
Dihle claimed, this literary form must have come into existence because a
great personality required it. In Aristotle’s notion of the “energy”, Georg
Misch found this first impulse responsible for establishing the form bywhich
the biography bears testimony to a historical figure’s character: the essential
features of the person being portraited should be shown by a skilful repres-
entation of a variety of his actions. Human nature exists only through its
various manifestations. Therefore, “Not by an enumeration of characterist-
ics, but the man’s acts were to be placed on record, so that his character
and nature were revealed by them. By means of this mode of seeing life in
action, the abstract element associated with every description of a human
being that approaches the individual from without, in the belief in charac-
teristics fixed once for all, could be brought into as close proximity to living
reality as possible within the limits of that method of approach.”23 According
to the German scholar, this was the method of portraying the great personal-
ities, which allowed the ancient biographies to both morally and artistically
influence life.
The biographical story takes as its material the deeds which make up an
individual existence, and, in this way, makes it possible to visualise the hero,
22 S. Brzozowski, Zakończenie (Conclusion), [in:] Idee…, p. 463.
23 G. Misch, A History of Autobiography in Antiquity (London: Routledge&Kegan Paul Limited,
1950), Vol. I, p. 292. The first sentence comes from a book by F. Leo, The History of Roman
Literature: Die griech.-röm. Biographie (1913), vol. I, p. 99.
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while also – through its telling the story of his struggle with fate – allows
us to ascertain if we are dealing with a character who is ready to act and “to
take the great responsibilities”; if it is someone trustworthy, serving as an
example to be followed. As empirical evidence, one’s own biography recom-
mends one as being eligible to go forward to others with a project to bring
about definedmoral, political, or social consequences. Political thinkers have
known for ages how valuable such personal testimony can be for carrying
out changes desired in the sphere of the social practice. Thucydides, who
wished for his own model of politeia to be a creative historical power, used –
as we know – fictional speeches of the leading Greek figures. For, in our prac-
tical life, in which feelings play as much a part as reason, and desire steers
us towards many things, we are not influenced by thoughts alone, and by ap-
peals to the intellectual powers of mind, he who would like to guide others
in this sphere of reality with fairness must produce evidence of his personal
attributes, such as: moral virtues, a strong will, common sense based on his
own life experiences, a stable temperament, and intuition in human affairs.
4 Ideas by Brzozowski as a biography of thought.
Bearing testimony to the author’s personality
Brzozowski’s Ideas consists of his articles from the years 1907–1910, which
were put in proper order by the author, and twoworks which were written in
1903: Filozofia czynu (The Philosophy of Act) and Filozofia czystego doświad-
czenia. Ryszard Avenarius (The Philosophy of Pure Experience. Richard Aven-
arius). The 7th to 14th chapters of the book and the Preface were meant for
the Ideas from their inception.24 The texts which make up the prior chapters
were published earlier by the author.25 However, this work does not show
Brzozowski’s entire philosophical path; as Andrzej Walicki noted, it includes
24These are: Pragmatyzm i materializm dziejowy (Pragmatism and Historical Materialism),
Prolegomena filozofii “pracy” (Prolegomena to the Philosophy of “Labour”), Bergson i Sorel
(Bergson and Sorel), Anty-Engels, Etapy sentymentalizmu (The Stages of Sentimentalism),
Złudzenia racjonalizmu (The Illusions of Rationalism), Alfred Loisy i zagadnienia modernizmu
katolickiego (Alfred Loisy and the Problems of Catholic Modernism), Zakończenie (Conclusion).
25These include: Materializm dziejowy jako filozofia kultury. Program filozoficzny (Historical
Materialism as a Philosophy of Culture. The Philosophical Programme), (Warsaw: Przegląd
Społeczny, 1907); Filozofia czystego doświadczenia. Ryszard Avenarius (The Philosophy of Pure
Experience. Richard Avenarius), (Warsaw: Głos, 1902/1903); Powstawanie prawa (The Creation
of Law), (Kiev: Świt, 1907); Epigenetyczna teoria historii (The Epigenetical Theory of History),
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neither his “struggle for world-view” period, nor the days when he identified
himself with Marxism26. The Ideas – the biography of the intellect – are “an
autopsy performed on my own memory,” as the philosopher writes in the
Conclusion to Ideas,27 with the purpose of revealing others, the individual
character of his thought by presenting its products (his thought “actions”),
and grasping its history as if it were a coherent whole. Moreover, he gave his
thought credibility by showing its process of being shaped under the influ-
ence of the problems which life set before it, 28 as well as by demonstrating
that by responding to them, his thought was taking on the great intellectual
powers of its epoch – Kantism, Hegelianism, Marxism, the philosophy of life
– and in accepting their influence, it also gave them something of its own, be-
cause by entering into conversation with them it at the same time “opened”
them to each other. Therefore, even keeping the company with the best, it
preserved its own identity, while always appreciating historical reality as an
ethical obligation, never as pure speculation that bore no reference to life.
Also to some extent, Ideas are testifying to its mistakes:
The article on Avenarius quite accurately represents my mental
state of hopeless spectatorship. The Philosophy of Act (Filozofia
czynu) was an early attempt at setting up a point of departure
from that seemingly hopeless situation. I have realised where
(Warsaw: Przegląd Filozoficzny, 1907); Przyroda i poznanie (Nature and Cognition), (Warsaw:
Przegląd Społeczny, 1907); Filozofia czynu (The Philosophy of Act), (Warsaw: Biblioteka Sam-
okształcenia. Dwutygodnik, 1903).
26 Compare: A. Walicki, Filozofia dojrzałości dziejowej (The Philosophy of Historical Maturity)
[in:] S. Brzozowski, Idee…, pp. 8–9.
27 S. Brzozowski, Idee…, p. 463.
28The fundamental question here seems to be the “youthfulness of Polish civilisation” he
deeply felt. The feeling that Polish thought is irrelevant to the “long-lasting and generally
developing problems of the life of the species”. The fact that “we do not want to measure
ourselves by that great yard-stick” (Pamiętnik…, p. 126, 127.) “Every reasonable Pole must
today feel the same: that our thoughts are mouldering away overnight. They can not with-
stand the touch of air and earth – the air and earth we and our fathers have deserved –
the only earth for us” (Pamiętnik…, p. 91). A personal problem dealing with the ability to
affect national reality is also important: “Despair steals in through every crack; despair and
discouragement. At this moment nothing connects me to life – I am alone, even if I know
that I can hold sway over that abstract knowledge, it does not want to come into being, to
turn into a feeling” (Pamiętnik…, p. 91). What then were the conditions which would be
necessary for the historical creation? The manner in which Brzozowski asked this question
and his answer to it recall Nietzsche’s remarks from the second of his Untimely Meditations
– our ability to shape the world depends on the way we create ourselves through history.
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the salvation lies, I know that the escape was in understanding
the active nature of thought, but this conviction was then only
knowledge, and my thought was in no way made utterly con-
crete, of the life which springs forth from action. I nonetheless
expected what was foundational and defined its meaning: a vi-
tal attitude towards life. This is also why this article was both so
wide-ranging in intention, and so abstract in execution.
(…) I always sawMarxism as nothing but theoretical knowledge,
showing that the world could be thought of as action; yet it was
not my action.
(…) Beyond its [Marxism’s] limits remained my “I”, which may
have even experienced itself to be the creator of theoretical
thought, but still not the producer of its own reality, and there-
fore felt less or more unsatisfied and hopeless. That “I” made
various efforts to deepen Marxism, working ceaselessly on the
misguided task of affecting change in its own vital feeling with
nothing more than its intellectual powers and logic.29
This was also to ensure others that they were dealing with a truly mature
personality – a thought which, in all seriousness, was putting itself to the
test against various philosophical systems, so as to gain an intellectual inde-
pendence after consecutive efforts and disappointments. In accordance with
the model of character formation whose classical pattern was established by
Goethe, it was only in this way that a spiritual independence was attained,
which provided a basis for acknowledging that a thought was ready to take
responsibility for the actions it might inspire, and that it might be a socially
useful, guide in new directions. The personality is the sum of its own tenden-
cies and conscious work on itself, as well as the impact of life surrounding it,
which requires an individual response. Only that which has been genuinely
experienced by the individual might serve as theory for subsequent action
and be instructive for others. Only that which has been personally attempted
in one’s own life can be considered finally conquered – a philosophy is not
invented at will, or obligation-free:
We can only replace what we have mastered; we can not con-
sider liberated of one belief, method, theory or form of culture
29 S. Brzozowski, Idee…, p. 74, 76.
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– as long as we don’t realise how that stiffened, lifeless function
came to be in the first place, as long as we have not learned to
perform this function freely and at will.
Any disrespect shown to a philosophy which does not systemat-
ically and creatively critique it goes hand in hand with submit-
ting to the influence of ideas and viewpoints which are merely
random. (…) To consciously convert life into the work of an indi-
vidual; this is what is essential and most profound in philosophy,
and there can be no talk about an abandoning of philosophy
which would not involve giving up consciousness as well.30
The personal factor must take part in a philosophy which would like to
serve practice – that is why Brzozowski’s work used the form of the bio-
graphy, which always speaks of individuality. If our object is to make reality
come closer to our ethical requirements through our thought, it must first be
shown that the legislator is a great personality. And that the idea now being
given as ameasure for empirical world has been verified via his own example
– it has created a true figure. The question of personality is undoubtedly one
of Brzozowski’s most important themes. In his Diary we find the following
remark:
The first general assumptions of my critique came into being
with my reading of Taine and my love for him. Then, there was
a period in which Nietzsche influenced my critical thought the
most. (…) Sorel led me out of that state. Sorel, Bergson and
Carlyle, but the ethical core, the notion of self, personality – the
summit, the star marking out the rules of all my efforts remained
clouded over (…) by the feeling that there was a gap between the
thought postulate and its organ, so that I am unable to develop
my own postulate. (…) That is just why I think about the mature
section of Ideas with such great pleasure, why I am so attached
to this book, because it was the first in which this disgrace and
flaw were absent.31.
The biography, as we well know, is both the story and creation of an
individual on the basis of the actions s/he performed, attested to by histor-
ical material, memory retained by a community, and the artistic talent of the
30 S. Brzozowski, Prolegomena filozofii “pracy” [in:] Idee…, pp. 237, 238.
31 S. Brzozowski, Pamiętnik, p. 129.
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historian telling us the whole story. Its subject is an individual life, which,
over its course, more or less consciously gave itself a shape. The biography
is therefore “artificial” in a double sense. Its protagonist – a figure in some
way distinguishing him/herself – is always a by-product of his/her own acts,
which carved into a spiritual mould what was given as natural, but also of the
historian’s exertions: a combination of documents recounting the protagon-
ist’s accomplishments and the imagination of the researcher. Similarly, the
biography of one’s own thought is a creative act in a double sense, through
which one gives oneself distinguishing features. The personality which ap-
pears before us is not found ready-made, but is a creation that what was
attained through a conscious creative process – it is an act, not a substance.
The Ideas by Brzozowski is a philosophical work which purposely as-
sumes the form of a biography of thought, because there is no better way, in
the field of practice, to justify a theory on interpersonal relationships than
personal testimonial. It is not also any means superior to narrative for allow-
ing thought to act in a phenomenal reality.
5 Philosophy as biography of thought. Some his-
torical reasons for understanding philosophy as
a form of a biography of thought.
However, there are the other important reasons which compel us to appreci-
ate the biography of thought in its role as a philosophical project, which very
consistently derives from the development of philosophy, and is not merely
a result of the formal inventiveness of the author.
It maintains, for instance, close contact with those anthropological ideas
which were introduced by the pedagogical thought of the German classics:
by Lessing, Herder and, above all, Goethe, but also Kant, in his concise treat-
ises on the philosophy of history, Fichte and Hegel. We may term it a dy-
namic formulation of human nature – what Thomas Mann would later call
the quintessence of humanism: “a drift towards the state when man reforges
himself from being some indistinct product of nature into a clear creation of
his own makingdoing, and thus of reason, and, in this way, fulfils his human
duty and calling”32. The writer’s comment was made with the reference to a
32 T. Mann, Goethe und Tolstoi. Zum Problem der Humanität (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1932). Goethe i
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remark by Goethe himself from a letter written to Lavater (September, 1780)
on his famous educational novel: “the desire to raise as high as possible the
pyramid of my being, whose foundations were given to me and reinforced;
this desire stands high above everything”33.
The Enlightenment owed the idea of man as a historical creature to Her-
der, but it was Goethe who made education the crucial question for under-
standing man, in his pedagogical composition Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre
und Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre, the story of educating an individual into
a personality, through the independent development of its own inclinations,
as well as its being guided by the Pedagogical Province to fulfil its obliga-
tions to its neighbours. This work, after all, is the poet’s response to his own
admonition: “the proper study of mankind is man”; this is both an anthropo-
logical and an ethical project, and one might indeed wonder if Goethe was
not brilliantly presaging that it was literature, more than dry philosophical
treatises and abstract thought, that could be a useful instrument in realising
this. From the viewpoint ofWilhelmMeisters Lehrjahre undWilhelmMeisters
Wanderjahre, human nature boils down to personality – internalising high
moral values and obtaining the intellectual independence that allows the
individual to overcome its natural particularism of practical interests and
co-operate in a rationally organised society – in the full sense of the word.
However, it should be added at once that – “to overcome” does not mean
“to relinquish” any professional, social, historical etc. definition. Because, as
Goethe said: “every life, every act, every art should be preceded by a craft,
which is acquired only by setting limitations”34. According to our author,
both historical and cultural conditions seem necessary for the existence of
the universal.
If we are prone to see personality as human nature in the full sense of this
word, it is tantamount to our recognising man to be an unsettled creature in
his initial empirical state, possessing no more than the natural disposition to
produce “himself”. Given the fact that making himself is his own task, man
Tołstoj (Goethe and Tolstoy), Polish transl M. Kłos-Gwizdalska. [in:] Dostojewski z umiarem
i inne eseje (Dostoyevski in Moderation, and Other Essays) (Warsaw: Muza SA, 2000), p. 107.
33 See: E. Trunz, Anmerkungen des Herausgebers [in:] Goethes Werke (Hamburg: Hamburger
Ausgabe in 14 Bänden, 1968), Band VII, p. 671.
34 J. W. Goethe, Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, 7. Auflage [in:] Goethes Werke (Hamburg: Ham-
burger Ausgabe in 14 Bänden, 1968), Band VII; Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre, 8. über-
arbeitete Auflage [in:] Goethes Werke (München 1973), Band VIII. Wilhelm Meister, Polish
transl. P. Chmielowski ( Warsaw 1893), p. 592.
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requires education – moulding his mental powers by himself, while taking
his social and cultural surroundings as a measure and an influence. Human
nature is therefore the combination of “natural” human capabilities with that
whichat was of the historical origin, arising from a complex process of the
education.
In his writing on the philosophy of history, Kant set forth this thought in
the language of philosophical concepts – he said it was Nature understood
as Providence that made a man a creature in which certain biological condi-
tions exist alongside free will and the faculty of reason, and whose destiny is
to be overcome his “naturalness” through shaping his mental powers (which
is possible only through a social way of living with others, and coming to
grips with various individual points of view). This “naturalness” is not his
actual nature, but the stratagem which Nature-Providence uses to force him
to make himself whom he should be. However, according to Kant, this plan
of Providence does not affect the life of concrete individuals, but of the whole
species, and what’s more, its success is very uncertain. How well-grounded
this uncertainty actually remains in the context of the assumptions of Kant’s
philosophising on history is a matter which can not be taken up here. Nev-
ertheless, there is an interesting consistency that appears in philosophical
reflection – the growing clarity of a way of thinking about man that takes
historical process into consideration and introduces dynamics into his philo-
sophical image.35
Let’s set this little-known historical aspect of Kant’s thought aside. In
the field of the philosophy of history, Fichte takes up his transcendental
point of view and considers history as if it were the development of spir-
itual events springing from the free activity of the absolute I – understood
not as a substance, but as a pure act and creative power. Fichte found the dy-
namic categories that allowed him to describe the course of the history in the
acts of the transcendental subjectivity. The structure of history is identical
to the energetic structure of the consciousness. The pure ego manifests itself
through empirical concrete selves – conceived as the ability to give defini-
tion to itself – its essence derives from its free activity. By its nature, it is the
35 See also: E. Paczkowska-Łagowska, Natura ludzka a historia. Refleksje w nawiązaniu do pism
antropologicznych Immanuela Kanta (The Human Nature and the History. Some Remarks on
the Anthropological Works by Immanuel Kant) in the collection of articles: Wyjaśniać i ro-
zumieć. Księga dedykowana Profesorowi Zbigniewowi Kuderowiczowi (Explaining and Under-
standing. A Book Dedicated to Prof. Z. Kuderowicz) (Białystok: Uniwersytet w Białymstoku,
2006).
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history of its own creations, and it does not know itself before its act is com-
mitted. As Berlin remarked, the new, strong idea of man thereby appears
to the European consciousness – a tragic hero striving for self-realisation
at all costs.36 This idea has, of course, its peculiar political and ethical con-
sequences.
Fichte revealed the reality which occurs to the consciousness as having
emerged from setting up and setting against, and their higher unity in the
transcendental subject. Hegel passed the remark on the authority of Kant
that development in both of these fields, the subjective and the objective,
might be expounded in terms of conceptual relations. However, as Wilhelm
Dilthey pointed out: “the conceptual system he was looking for did not aim
at giving aspects of life an abstract formulation and arrangement; he rather
strove for a new system of concepts wherein development would become
fully comprehensible. (…) the whole domain of history became his object. He
was everywhere searching for activity, progress, whose essence was always
embedded in conceptual relations. This is also why history was converted
into philosophy.”37 In the above excerpt, Dilthey circumspectly points out
that the Hegelian attempt to explain historical goings-on via concepts leads
to “the impoverishment and fossilisation of life in history”38 – historiography
turns into philosophy. Everyday life, which we know from our experience,
lies outside of Hegel’s interests; as he wrote: “occurrences which possess a
universal significance (…) I usually see as a pretext for universal considera-
tions in the face of which anything singular and near at hand, regardless of
howmuch it may absorb the emotions, recedes into the background.”39 How-
ever, for Hegel, history changes into philosophy in another sense as well,
36 I. Berlin, The Sense of Reality. Studies in Ideas and their History, (London: Chatto & Windus
Limited, 1996). Zmysł rzeczywistości. Studia z historii idei, Polish transl. M. Filipczuk (Poznań:
Zysk i S-ka, 2002), p. 237.
37W. Dilthey,Der Aufbau der geschichtlichenWelt in den Geisteswissenschaften, Plan der Fortset-
zung zum Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften, Zusätzse zum Auf-
bau der geschichtlichen Welt [in:] W. Dilthey,Gesammelte Schriften (Göttingen: B. G. Teubner
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1973), 6. unveränderte Auflage, VII Band. Budowa świata historycznego
w naukach humanistycznych (The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences),
Polish transl. E. Paczkowska-Łagowska (Gdańsk: słowo/obraz terytoria, 2004), pp. 47, 48.
38 Ibidem, p. 127.
39 Letter to Niethammer from 1816. See: K. Löwith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der revolutionäre
Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1995). Od
Hegla do Nietzschego. Rewolucyjny przełom w myśli XIX wieku, Polish transl. S. Gromadzki
(Warsaw: KR, 2001), pp. 262, 263.
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one of greater interest to us here; this was because of the regard he held for
what is in mid-course, and dynamic in life. The Phenomenology of Spirit was
sometimes called a Bildungsroman, not unlike Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre
und Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre,40 due to its presenting the story of the
self-education of the spirit entering into historical existence (the empirical
world emerges from itself and stands face-to-face as a self-in-itself), with the
purpose of obtaining freedom and self-knowledge at the end of a long learn-
ing process.This is the only possible path which leads to becoming cognisant
of one’s own nature, because:
knowledge is the cognisance not only of itself, but also of its neg-
ation, of its limit. To become conscious of one’s own boundaries
means to be able to sacrifice oneself. This act of the self-sacrifice
is the exteriorisation in which the spirit presents to itself its be-
coming a spirit in the form of free, accidental [historical] event,
seeing its pure self as time outside of itself, and its being as space.
This becoming in space – or nature – is its vital, immediate be-
coming; nature – the exteriorised spirit – is in its existence noth-
ing other than the eternal exteriorisation of its own permanent
existence and the motion which restores the subject.41
Then, in the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, we read:
The fact that a pre-division takes place in the idea (Das Sich-
Urteilen der Idee) into both phenomena [the nature and the spirit],
defines them as its (the self-recognising reason) manifestations,
and there occurs the return to its unity by making what is mov-
ing ahead and developing the nature of things, the concept, and
this movement is to the same degree the activity of cognition
– the eternal idea being in-itself and for-itself, as the absolute
spirit is perpetually setting itself in motion, producing itself and
relishing in itself.42
40 For instance: J. Hyppolyte,Genĕse et Structure de la Phénoménologie de l’Esprit de Hegel (Paris:
Éditions Montaigne, 1946).
41 G. W. F. Hegel, Die Phänomenologie des Geistes, hrsg. von J. Hoffmeister (Leipzig 1949), [563,
564]. Fenomenologia ducha (The Phenomenology of the Spirit), Polish transl. A. Landmann
(Warsaw: 1963), vol. 2, pp. 426, 427.
42 G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopäedie der philosophischen Wissenschaften [in:] Werke in 12 Bänden
(Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1970), Bd. 10. Encyklopedia nauk filozoficznych (The Encyclopaedia
of the Philosophical Sciences), Polish transl. Ś. F. Nowicki (Warsaw: PWN, 1990), p. 584.
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6 Biography of thought as a dynamic form of ex-
pounding the historical spirit and life
We might now naturally pose the question of the form of expounding that
which to itself is presented as being a space-time process (history). Neither
a definition nor a simple enumeration of the signs of activity seem to suffice
here – that which is becoming and self-creating requires a dynamic means
to express itself, and the biographical narrative proves exactly such an en-
ergetic tool. If philosophy – “the thought which thinks itself” – is an idea,
and thus the uniform totality of self-knowledge from all its earlier stages, it
needs an expression for itself so as to be more than an “empty name”. Simil-
arly, any “characterisation” would never reveal the personality of a protag-
onist, but only the whole story of his vicissitudes. If the Hegelian spirit is
by its nature historical and is its various historical manifestations of itself,
then the biography, on account of its ability to show both the unity and the
diversity of the aspects of one life – the subjective and the objective in their
mutual connection – appears as an adequate tool for its philosophical ex-
pression. The meaning of the biography – as Dilthey once put it – lies in that
“binding of life in its multiplicity with historiography”.43 Hegel distinguished
himself with his brilliant sense of history, but his thinking on the histor-
ical world, the basis of which was the spirit as an over-subject and dynamic
power, was still a metaphysical viewpoint. It was Hegel, however, who led
philosophy to change its perspective on the historical; in consequence, the
standing of historiography (and within it of biography) takes the higher rank
as an instrument of philosophical anthropology. The philosophy of life paid
particular attention to this literary form – Dilthey was of the opinion that
biography allowed us to acquire “deeper insight into human life and its indi-
vidual figures”, and provided philosophy with categories which would make
it possible to grasp the experience fuller than scientific methods. It provides
a glance into the innumerable ways that the events making up a tempor-
ary human existence can be systematically set in order. It also presents the
course an individual life takes to construct itself as a nexus of events. On
the other hand, Nietzsche considered the usefulness of the biography for the
creative life as a method of mastering one’s own past, and which gives man
power over his own future; which allows him to introduce his own project
into it. The past is the most dangerous adversary of the will, which seeks to
43W. Dilthey, Budowa świata historycznego w naukach humanistycznych…, p. 251.
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establish the future on the basis of new values. The second of the Untimely
Meditations: On the Use and Abuse of History for Life is a classic reflection on
this question. Let us now take both of these viewpoints together, as well as
their significance in the epoch of empirical philosophising.
Through an examination of existing types of the world-views, Dilthey
concluded that their source was the problem of life, which flowed from re-
flective individual’s personal sensation of her own vitality: the experience
of birth, death, the passing of the generations, family kinship, fighting with
others for the objects of our desires, and the experience of one’s own frailty
in the face of the constancy of the nature. These do not by any means have
the “clinical questions of the intellect” at their foundation:
Philosophy produces an awareness of the unity of our experi-
ences, our activities, our very life; it raises this consciousness to
the level of the conceptual thinking. The unity of this whole, the
unity of what comprises it: objects, experiences of structure and
the law, states of living, aims and goods – that web of nettle-
some and fascinating problems, intellectual pleasure and pain
of the imperfection, contradictions: this is the riddle of life; the
peculiar, dark, terrifying subject of all philosophy.44
7 Biography of thought as a place where man
develops orientation in the world
The biography (the autobiography as a coming-to-terms with one’s own life
and thought is its variant) – which was given the rank of philosophy by
Hegel’s authority, in the days of the latter’s definitive leave-taking from
metaphysics – becomes a place where man develops some orientation in the
reality based on past actions, which were written down, the values assigned
to events, the significance given to concrete aspects of his own life, a mul-
titude of tiny facts. And through creating himself in it (the biography/auto-
44W. Dilthey, Das Wesen der Philosophie [in:] Gesammelte Schriften (Leipzig-Berlin: Teubner
Verlag, 1924), Bd. V; Die Typen der Weltanschauung und ihre Ausbildung in den metaphysis-
chen Systemen [in:] Gesammelte Schriften (Leipzig-Berlin: Teubner Verlag, 1931), Bd. VIII. O
istocie filozofii i inne pisma (On the Essence of Philosophy and Other Essays): Pojęcie filozofii
(Essence of Philosophy) [IIB], Polish transl. E. Paczkowska-Łagowska (Warsaw: PWN, 1987),
pp. 204, 205.
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biography) as a particular character, he builds a foundation for himself to
plan the future. Brzozowski thus characterises the post-metaphysical situ-
ation of the consciousness:
The problem stands thus. History has provided us with a very
multiform spiritual culture. Different people aremoved (or rather
set themselves in motion and thereby think they are moved)
through various beliefs. What is the most important here is not
the sort of belief, but the things these people do. (…) Proud philo-
sophy reveals its limitations. Do something, just do something!
But what?
(…) If the life is our fundamental reality, if a man is a giant un-
ceasingly struggling with the elements of nature, he must even-
tually become his own legislator. He no longer feels satisfied
with being moved by thought: he realises that thought must
be something that differs from the custom of serving soldiers
a round of rum before battle, he wants thought not as just a
mover, but for him to make it come true. What is such a thought
which might deserve to be realised by man? Shall we randomly
pull from the chaos of imaginings to search out the gods among
them? (…) To realise, to create, a man can only have himself as his
goal. At the very moment when the human struggle with the un-
known appears to us as reality – our only aim can be the victory
of man. What does “victory” mean? That a man not move like
the sail of the windmill whose speed would be – if it only could
think – unwound by enthusiasm and justification, but his being
himself and self-consciously hold himself over the abyss. What
is an act? (…) An act is what in the non-human world produces
outcomes which endure and depend on our will, what in the
very essence of life produces the ability to bring about such ef-
fects and to maintain this ability. Work is the only fundamental
act – consciously self-governing work is perfection.45
In the post-metaphysical times, there is nothing but the empirical indi-
vidual at the foundation of the historical world – the rational will responsible
for its shape and dynamics. It binds itself through its own law of reason, be-
cause it wishes to be autonomous, to be free of accidental subjugation to the
45 S. Brzozowski, Pragmatyzm i materializm dziejowy [in:] Idee…, pp. 210, 211.
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natural instincts and the impulses. However, this law of the reason which
allows it to “hold itself above the abyss” – and thus to control itself as an
undetermined being and that is open to the future – is not given in advance.
Just as it does not know its nature before the latter reveals itself through
an act, it must attain the right on the basis of what has already been car-
ried out in its history, while taking into consideration the past and contem-
porary problem situation, thus creating for itself rules of conduct. In both
of these functions – as a tool which unfolds a man’s nature before him (or
perhaps we should say: character) and something which lays out his future
through establishing his essential features – the biography or the autobio-
graphy appears. Theory and practice intertwine, because the understanding
of what happens in one life, the granting of significance to concrete facts
(the result of both the lifestyle and the composition of the story), puts the
man making this sort of reflection in the new relationship vis a vis himself.
The biography and the autobiography respond to man’s natural need to be
oriented in a world where reflecting on human affairs is impossible from an
extra-historical viewpoint. Having said this, it seems natural that this form
of expressing and studying man’s nature was used by philosophy. And so it
is also in this context, and not only on account of the need to provide evid-
ence of his morality and ability to live a good life, that Brzozowski’s attempt
at expounding his philosophy in the form of a biography of thought seems
to be worth serious consideration.
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